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Abstract This paper presents an experimental approach to compare the perfor-
mance of alternative business process designs. We use an example case of an
electronic group buying setting to demonstrate how our approach can be applied in
practice. More specifically, we chose a standard business process, the sales process
as implemented on a group buying platform, to illustrate how a business process
may be redesigned in order to better meet the needs of customers. For that purpose,
we introduce a social technology feature to support cooperation among buyers in the
sales process and then analyze the performance impact of the proposed business
process redesign. We combine principles from design science and experimental
economics to aid the business redesign process. To allow for an experimental
evaluation in a controlled laboratory setting, we implement a simplified prototype
model and an experimental electronic group-buying platform in the laboratory. We
then employ the methods of experimental economics to generate process perfor-
mance data and evaluate the effectiveness of the new process model design in the
lab that can provide valuable insights to platform managers for redesigning the real-
world system. We posit that combining the principles of design science and
experimental economics offers researchers a useful and cost-effective method to
systematically evaluate theoretical predictions about process model design.
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1 Introduction
Many firms, especially in the electronic commerce and social commerce sectors,
depend critically on continuously developing an online business platform that
implement various interconnected automated business processes that support their
business. As markets and technology evolve businesses need to consider redesign-
ing core business processes to better meet the needs of their customers. In many
cases, businesses may be able to test new design features with traditional software
development methods before deploying them on the public platform or conduct real-
time Internet field experiments. In some cases, however, the impact of altering a
core business process on business performance or customer satisfaction may be
uncertain and present a significant business risk. In this paper, we propose
combining design science (Hevner et al. 2004) with experimental economics (Smith
1989) as a novel approach to systematically examine new business process model
designs. This approach is particularly appropriate for process model analysis of
business processes that newly incorporate virtual features.
In order to demonstrate how our proposed business process evaluation works we
choose a particular example of an online platform based business from the social
commerce sector and focus on the design of one specific business process. In recent
years, a number of different social commerce platforms have been developed on the
Internet and some of them have beenwidely adopted by consumers (Liang and Turban
2012). These social commerce sites, which are using social technology1 to support
some form of implicit or explicit consumer-to-consumer coordination, are evolving
and reshaping the business environment by offering consumers newways of shopping
for products and services (Lang and Li 2013–2014). This includes coordinating group
purchases on electronic group-buying sites like Group on or Living Social. The
dynamic and interactive features of social commerce business processes increase the
complexity of business process modeling and analysis, compared to the conventional
business to consumer sales process. In the present paper, we look at the issue of how
businesses can evaluate alternative business process designs that incorporate new
technology features using the example of a standard business process (sales process)
for one specific platform based business(electronic group buying).
Applying Overby’s (2008) virtual process theory, we propose an IT-driven
process redesign (Davenport and Short 1990), introducing a trading mechanism that
adds social features to the sales process. In accordance with design science (Hevner
et al. 2004) we develop and evaluate the new business process design. While the
majority of design science research is primarily concerned with the original
development of quality software artifacts, information systems researchers are
particularly well positioned to address the important issue of evaluating the business
performance of the system design (Hevner et al. 2004; Gregor and Hevner 2013).
However, system evaluation in an organizational context is difficult and expensive
and there is a lack of clear guidelines how to conduct it without disrupting business
operations (Peffers et al. 2008).
1 Social technology refers to software that connects users and supports user-to-user interactions, and is
typically deployed over Internet or mobile platforms.
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To address this gap, we propose controlled experiments as a cost-effective
system design evaluation approach that can be done in the laboratory prior to real-
world deployment without disturbing business. While lab experiments cannot fully
replicate the richness and complexity of a real-world business setting, they can
generate valuable performance indicators that business management can use as
critical information input to decide if the new design should be launched or
reconsidered. As our particular evaluation method, we propose using experimental
economics and implement a simplified prototype that creates an exchange platform
for group buyers and sellers who are trading items and compare the performance of
two trading mechanism designs (Chen and Ledyard 2010).
Our particular aim in the paper is three-fold. First and foremost, we propose
combining principles of design science and experimental economics as versatile and
useful approach for businesses that need to decide what new platform features to
offer to their customers in uncertain market environments. We suggest that this
approach presents a cost-effective way to learn about the effects of new features in
laboratory experiments, which can supply businesses with valuable information that
they can use to make the decision what new features to deploy commercially in the
market. Second, we present an example business process design to demonstrate
how, in principle, our approach would work in practice. For that purpose, we use a
typical sales process in electronic group-buying and develop an alternative business
process design that incorporates a social communication feature. We then show how
laboratory experiments can be used to efficiently evaluate the new business process
design.
The paper is organized as follows. Next, in Sect. 2, we introduce a new design for
the group buying business process. Following the new design, we will discuss three
theoretical aspects—economic performance, information exchange behavior, and
market efficiency—for the purpose of evaluating the new design. Correspondingly,
we will propose specific hypotheses derived from our theoretical discussion. In the
next section, we present the experimental design and procedures. In Sect. 5, discuss
our data analysis and the results. Finally we discuss our findings and conclude the
study.
2 Redesigning the group buying sales process
Group buying is a specific type of social commerce, where an intermediary provides
a platform allowing potential buyers to group together to purchase a good or service.
According to economic theory, group buying benefits both buyers and sellers, in the
sense of lowering transaction cost and aggregating consumer demand (Anand and
Aron 2003). Through analytical modeling, research suggests that an improved
cooperation process among group buyers can benefit both buyers and sellers in
terms of profits (Chen et al. 2009; Jing and Xie 2011). Interestingly, however, on
most current group buying platforms, including Groupon.com, for example, there
are no specific social media tools available that would assist buyer coordination and
cooperation. Instead, potential buyers cooperate as groups only implicitly, for
example by joining a deal that is on offer. Thus, and in accordance with Overby
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(2008) we make an effort to explore an explicit, virtualized process design that
includes some social technology support for user coordination and cooperation.
Specifically, we choose a group-buying platform with buyer competition that
includes a double auction as our specific trading mechanism.
Our study follows principles of design science research as stipulated by Gregor
and Hevner (2013). As indicated in Table 1, we design, implement, and evaluate an
IT artifact (in our case an electronic group-buying platform system). More
specifically, we redesign a particular business process (sales negotiation between
buyers and sellers) that is implemented on the group-buying platform, and compare
the performance of the old and the new design. In this study we focus in particular
on step (5) of the DSR principles (evaluation) by using methods from experimental
economics to evaluate the two designs with respect to organizational and economic
performance measures. In this paper, and as indicated in Table 1, we distinguish
between the commercial platform software in the real-world setting that is the target
system for the redesign (IT artifact) and the simplified prototype model that we
usefor our experimental evaluation in the laboratory.2
Drawing on the theory3 of consumer informedness (Clemons 2008; Granados
et al. 2010) and the theory of media synchronicity (Dennis et al. 2008), we propose a
business process model for one specific group buying setting, in which social
communication is supported—in form of a private communication channel that is
implemented as a standard chat box—to improve buyer coordination. Informedness
theory conceptualizes the level of information that is available to consumers and
specifically argues that consumer informedness is increasing because of advances in
electronic communication (including social communication tools) and that this
reduces information asymmetry between sellers and buyers. Media richness theory
argues that for electronic communication to be most effective it must be aligned
with the communication task at hand and that performing more complex tasks needs
richer media support. Hence, communication level is our primary independent
variable of interest. Increasing communication level is directly associated with
increasing consumer informedness. The specific choice of the chatbox tool to
increase communication level is derived from media richness theory.
We also consider the possibility of buyer competition, that is, that there are more
potential buyers in the market than can be accommodated by the available offer.
Group size, that is, the number of potential buyers, is also an important factor and
we decided to control for it experimentally. Hence, we manipulate two independent
variables, availability of social communication (supported/not supported) and also
the size of the buyer groups (small vs. big) as a secondary variable of interest.
Our main dependent variable of interest is economic performance of the group
buyers measured as buyer surplus. In a group-buying auction with buyer
2 In a fully developed business application, the experimental platform would likely include a simplified
and scaled-down version of the commercial platform software and might use a formal business process
language like UML to specify the alternative business process designs that are evaluated. Our prototype
model is implemented with the z-tree software.
3 While it is desirable to base business process redesign proposals on theoretical arguments, our
evaluation approach can also be used with purely exploratory rather than theoretically grounded
hypotheses.
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competition, buyers work cooperatively to generate a joint bid with a commonly
agreed-on price, while they face at the same time peer competition as only the
individual buyers with the highest bids will eventually join the group bid. Standard
economic theory on competitive markets holds that buyers will tend to bid higher
(and closer to their maximum willingness to pay) than in markets with less
competition, thus reducing buyer surplus. However, recent research in electronic
commerce also suggests that introducing a communication channel among buyers
will increase market transparency and reduce uncertainty by improving the buyer’s
informedness through information exchange (Clemons 2008; Granados et al. 2010).
From a technology perspective, we need to decide how to implement the
information exchange tools (i.e. the social communication tool). To that regard, we
focus on task-technology fit, that is, on how the technological feature fits the task
requirements present in group buying. The communication process pertaining to the
group-buying task is a typical convergent process, which demands verification,
negotiation, and clarification (Lind and Zmud 1991). According to the theory ofmedia
synchronicity, a synchronous instant messaging tool can nicely fit the communication
process needs (Dennis et al. 2008). With the appropriate communication tools, group
buyers can collaborate more effectively in order to reach an agreed bidding price and
consequently generate better payoffs (Zigurs and Buckland 1998).
In the management literature, a business process is typically defined as a set of
linked steps, activities and tasks that generate an organizational output or customer
Table 1 Application of design science research principles
Principle steps in DSR
[based on Gregor and
Hevner (2013, p. 342)]
Example case: group-buying platform design
Identify problem Should we redesign the business process that governs the sales negotiation
between buyers and sellers on our group-buying platform and add a new
social communication feature (e.g. a chatbox)?
Define solution objectives Improve buyer coordination and group performance
Design and development Business process model (shown in Fig. 1)
Experimental lab prototype implemented with z-tree software (see ‘‘The
experimental software: z-tree’’ of appendix )
Demonstration Pilots were run with various user groups who followed the buyer/seller user
instructions (see ‘‘Instructions for buyers’’ and ‘‘Instructions for sellers
(small groups)’’ of appendix). The example screen shots (‘‘Example buyer
screens’’ and ‘‘Example seller screen’’ of appendix ) demonstrate the look
and feel of the (experimental) software
Evaluation Controlled laboratory experiments that evaluate the impact of redesigning
the group buying sales process by introducing a social communication tool
on group performance in terms of coordination and buyer profits (detailed
in Sects. 4 and 5)
Communication Communication between the principle investigators of the experimental
evaluation study and the business mangers who are in charge of the group–
buying platform and business operations. This would include research
reports that summarize the results of the evaluation experiments,
interpretation of the findings, and discussion of possible modifications
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product (Davenport 1993; Hammer and Champy 1993; Rummler and Brache 1995).
They are often represented with some kind of formal or informal flowchart as
sequences of events, activities and decision points. For our case, we use the
flowchart in Fig. 1 to depict the group buying business process model, showing the
business process that governs how buyers purchase items from sellers at a
conceptual level,4 and indicates how the addition of a social communication tool
alters the process. Notice that the sales process shown in Fig. 1 is composed of
several sub-processes that model bidding, review and approval, and consumer
coordination. On the left hand side of Fig. 1, we show the original business process
that does not feature social communication support. The right hand side presents the
redesign of the group buying sales process that shares the principle design of the
original process but critically adds social communication support among buyers by
adding the two activities ‘‘post/read messages’’ and ‘‘observe the market.’’
3 Theoretical background and hypothesis development
In the new design of the group buying business process, we introduce an
information exchange capability for the buyers, by adding a communication channel
available to buyers. The communication is private to buyers and cannot be accessed
by the seller. To evaluate the impact of the added communication capability, we
focus on three theoretical aspects—economic performance, information exchanging
behavior, and market efficiency.5
Looking at economic performance, we can analyze the direct effect of adding the
communication channel on group buying performance. Under competition, buyers
should tend to increase their bidding prices more aggressively in order to win the
bid over the competition from other potential buyers (Ku et al. 2005). Without the
availability of a private communication channel, buyers need to make their bidding
decisions solely based on public information, that is, by observation of the market
prices that are posted publicly on the trading platform.
Information exchange supported by communication channels can help buyers
acquire more information directly from other buyers, information beyond the signals
that buyers send when posting their bid prices on the trading platform. However, in
our case there is no regulation or monitoring what information buyers can share in
the private communication channel, which means that the information quality in
terms of relevance, correctness, accuracy, and efficiency is uncertain to the receiver
of the information. Nevertheless, Theories of consumer informedness and
information transparency (Clemons 2008; Granados et al. 2010; Holthausen and
Verrecchia 1990) argues that more information release will result in both positive
informedness effects and consensus effects, meaning consumers or agents will
become more knowledgeable about the market or product and they can reach
4 We use a simple and informal representation of the group-buying business process. In real business
settings, it would be preferable to use some formal business process model representation language, such
as UML, for example (Russel et al. 2006).
5 For readers who are interested in a more general overview of related studies on group buying behavior
and economics tested in laboratory experiments we refer to Pelaez et al. (2013).
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agreement more easily. In the group buying context, informedness and consensus
are critically important for making better bidding decision and achieving better
bidding outcomes in terms of higher buyer surplus.
Another important factor for economic group buying performance is group size.
Researchers have found that buyer concentration is a source for countervailing
power, which can lower seller margins and accrue more surplus at the buyers’ side
(Galbraith 1952; Scherer and Ross 1990). Galbraith (1952), in his influential work,
originally focused on the buying consortiums of his time and noted that large buying
groups were able to resist actions by monopolistic sellers. Galbraith recognized that
it was theoretically possible for consumers to exercise some form of direct
countervailing power, too, but pointed out that it would be unrealistic to expect it to
occur in practice at any significant level because of the difficulty for them to
coordinate effectively. Rha and Widdows (2002) extended this view to electronic
commerce settings. Recent economic experiments on countervailing power have
shown that even a small number of buyers can influence monopolist pricing,

















































Fig. 1 Business process model design (group buying sales process)
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Hypothesis 1 Introducing communication channels among group buyers will
increase buyer profits.
Hypothesis 2 Increasing the group size of buyers in a group-buyer model will
increase buyer profits.
The second theoretical perspective that we take to investigate the effects of our new
business process design is market efficiency. We assume that under an efficient
market, all buyers make rational decisions. Simon (1972) suggests that there are three
prerequisites for rational decision-making: the identification of all potential alterna-
tives, the determination of all implied consequences, and the capability to evaluate the
effectiveness of each set of consequences. In reality, however, individual decision
makers have cognitive difficulties in acquiring and correctly processing the
information about all the possible alternatives and consequences. Without social
communication, buyers tend to make decisions in a closed system using only a limited
number of variables and consequence (Simon 1972), and the central objective of
buyers in these circumstance is to merely find some solution that satisfies their own
personal goal constraints, even if it is less than what could be achieved.
The information exchange among buyers, supported by the presence of
communication channels, can not only provide more information about potential
alternatives, but also enable explicit cooperation among buyers even though
competition still exists. The information transparency and shifting the focus from
pure competition to cooperation under competitive conditions should lead to a more
efficient market. The buyers in an efficient market perform differently from the
buyers in an inefficient market in two major aspects.
First, in an efficient market, such as a double auction, the buyers with low
willingness to pay (Lo-WTP) tend to be more active in terms of moving the bids to a
level that is acceptable to their personal constraints. Bidding price initiation is
critical important for a group bidding, because inexperienced bidders look to other
bidders to conceptualize their bidding strategies (e.g. Rasmusen 2006; Simonsohn
and Ariely 2008). Second, in an efficient market, which carries less uncertainty, all
buyers tend to make more rational decisions. Specifically, everything else being
equal, in an efficient market, the buyers with high willingness to pay (Hi-WTP) are
more likely to join the final bidding price, while buyers with Lo-WTP are less likely
to be able to join in the final bidding price because of their given constraints
imposed by their different WTP values. Hence, we propose the following.
Hypothesis 3 Introducing a private communication channel among group buyerswill
improve market efficiency, so that Lo-WTP buyers are more active in terms of leading
the bidding prices than the buyers in the groups without communication channels.
Hypothesis 4 Introducing a private communication channel among group buyers will
improve market efficiency, so that more Hi-WTP buyers will win the bid in the groups
with communication channels than in the groups without communication channels.
To open the black box of the group buying business process, we also investigate
how the buyers, who have distinct needs, use the communication channel. In the
group buying process, buyers will experience risk and uncertainty. Theory of
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information search suggests that when perceived market uncertainty increases, the
intensity of information search will increase (Rothschild 1974; Kuhlthau 1999).
With incomplete and imperfect market information, buyers tend to search for the
lowest price available in the market (Rothschild 1974). Compared with the buyers
with Hi-WTP, the buyers with Lo-WTP are subject to higher perceived uncertainty
because they have less chance to win the bid and even winning the bid, they will
acquire lower surplus. Thus buyers with Lo-WTP should show a stronger
motivation to exchange messages with other buyers. In the similar vein, compared
with the buyers in small groups, the buyers in bigger groups experience a higher
level of market uncertainty. When group size increases, the task complexity will
increase as well. The groups with more potential buyers have more diverse needs
and more potential conflicts that derive from the differences in their WTP values,
which together will result in more market uncertainty. Driven by the uncertainty,
buyers in bigger groups tend to be more active in the information exchange
activities than those in small groups. Therefore we propose that:
Hypothesis 5 Buyers with low WTP tend to post more messages than buyers with
high WTP.
Hypothesis 6 Buyers in bigger groups tend to post more messages than buyers in
small groups given more potential competition and higher level of market
uncertainty.
4 Experimental design and procedures
In order to simulate an electronic market with a group-buying platform that connects
buyers and sellers in the laboratory we need to implement a functioning trading
platform that our subjects can use to coordinate, negotiate, and buy items in the
experiment. This includes specific trading rules that specify how sellers and buyers
interact and how transaction prices are determined as well as calculating economic
indicators (like buyer profit) that measure group performance in economic terms.6
We use a variant of a double auction mechanism to facilitate price determination.7
When a buyer initiates the bidding process, at a certain price, other buyers can join
the bid if they agree with the price. When the number of followers reaches the seller’s
threshold requirement, the group bid will be routed to the seller, who will then decide
to accept or reject it. If the seller accepts the offer, only the buyers who joined the
group bid win, the rest of them lose the bid. If the seller rejects the bid, a new round of
bidding, or price negotiation, starts. Under the traditional design, group buyers
participate in bidding and price negotiation through public bidding platforms with no
6 The trading terms (economic performance measures like buyer profit or surplus), bidding rules, and
mechanism (double auction) are standard techniques in experimental economics.
7 Research in experimental economics has shown that the continuous double auction is generally the best
performing pricing mechanism in terms of allocative efficiency of resources and also in terms of
convergence speed, which is particularly important in laboratory experiments where trading sessions have
be very short. For those reasons, double auctions are the default pricing mechanism for market
experiments.
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private buyer communication. Our revised business process design offers a social
communication tool to buyers for private message exchanges. We then compare the
performance of the two process designs experimentally in the laboratory.
We designed an economic experiment that created an electronic group buying
market in the laboratory where participants were asked to coordinate group
purchases of a single, private value product from a monopolistic seller (see
‘‘Instructions for buyers’’ and ‘‘Instructions for sellers (small groups)’’ of
appendices for the specific buyer and seller instructions that were used in the
experiment). Each individual buyer is given a pre-assigned value, the willingness to
pay (WTP), for the same single product. This induces demand heterogeneity on the
buyer side. Consumer valuations vary across buyers and each buyer needs to buy
one unit of the product. The experimental environment and sales process prototype
were developed using the z-tree software (see ‘‘The experimental software: z-tree’’
of appendix for an overview of z-tree and its applications) and implemented in a
Windows client–server networked environment (Fischbacher 2007).
A total of 224 participants were recruited for the experiment from an undergraduate
student subject pool at Baruch College that is associated with taking the introduction
course to information systems that is required for all business students. All of themwere
business majors and the proportion of females and males were about even. The subjects
were fairly homogeneous in terms of age, educational background, and IT savvy. For
completing the experimental task they were compensated with course credit. They
received instructions (shown as ‘‘Instructions for buyers’’ of appendix) that explained
the nature of the experiment and the tasks theywere asked to complete in the experiment.
We used a 2 9 2 design, shown in Table 2, in which wemanipulated two variables
at two levels, group size (4 or 8) and communication support (a private communication
channel available, and not available). The 224 participants were assigned to 32 groups,
with 8 groups for each cell of the 2 9 2 design. Each group participated in 10 rounds of
the experiment. Each session consisted of groups with 1 seller (monopolist) and either
4 or 8 potential buyers. Example trading screens for seller and buyer participants are
included as ‘‘Example buyer screens’’ and ‘‘Example seller screen’’ of appendices. In
small groups, 4 potential buyers bid for 2 products from the seller, meaning only two
potential buyers will win the bid. Similarly, in big groups, 8 potential buyers bid for 4
slots to obtain a unit of the product. Buyer competition occurs because there are fewer
slots for joining a bid than there are potential buyers in the market. We induced time
pressure by limiting the auctions to two-and-a-half minutes each. Ten rounds of
auctionswere conducted, and in each round of auctions buyers the randomly generated
WTP values were reused and rotated. We used the same trading platform that was
developed by Pelaez et al. (2013) for a different study.
5 Data analysis and design evaluation
The 224 participants were assigned to 32 groups. 8 groups for each cell of the 2 9 2
factorial design. Each group participated in 10 rounds of the experiment. Among the
320 bids, 277 bids were accepted by sellers within the given time limit, and only
those data records were included in our data analysis.
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In order to test our hypotheses H1 and H2, which involve relationships using group
size and communication level as the independent variables and average buyer profit as
the dependent variable, we ran a multiple regression test. The descriptive results are
displayed in Table 2 and, in addition, the most interesting finding is also highlighted
graphically in Fig. 2. The test regression results are summarized in Table 3.
We find from Table 2 that the bigger groups (GS = 8) generate about 8 % more
profit ($38.14) than the smaller groups (GS = 4; $35.30). As seen from model 1 in
Table 3, this difference between larger and smaller groups was statistically
significant (p\ 0.05). Regarding the effect of providing buyers with a private
communication channel, our analysis (Table 2) shows that groups with the
communication channel present perform about 10 % better overall ($38.49) than
the groups without private communication ($34.99). According to model 2 in
Table 3, this difference between groups with and without communication channel
was statistically significant (p\ 0.05). Interestingly, however, we also find (as
indicated graphically in Fig. 2) that the benefits from using a private communication
channel went mostly to small groups, which were gaining almost 20 % in profits.
Large groups, on the other hand, only benefited marginally from it. In ‘‘Example
chatbox messages’’ of appendix , we include a few sample message postings to
illustrate how buyers were using the communication tool. In the regression model,
as indicated in Table 3, we used the binary variables P1 through P9, representing the
experimental periods 1 through 9,8 to control for the effect of repeated
measurements. These results support our hypotheses 1 and 2.
To evaluate market efficiency, we examined if adding the communication
channel increased market efficiency, meaning that it would benefit the Hi-WTP
buyers more than the Lo-WTP buyers. As hypothesized in H3 and H4, we compared
Lo-WTP buyers (i.e. buyers who were given a low WTP parameter value) and Hi-
WTP buyers (those who were given a high WTP value) in terms of winning
percentage and bidding initiation level. To indicate bidding activity we looked at
level of bidding price initiation, comparing Lo-WTP and Hi-WTP bidders. To
measure the winning percentage we also looked at the number of winning bidders
versus bidders losing out in the final bid. We expected that introducing the private
communication channel would have a positive effect on the bidding performance of
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Avg. buyer profit Without communication With communication
n Mean SD n Mean SD n Total
GS = 4 69 32.19 20.42 68 38.46 21.02 137 35.30
GS = 8 70 37.75 22.53 70 38.52 21.19 140 38.14
Total 139 34.99 21.99 138 38.49 21.11 277 36.73
The buyer profits are normalized by group size (GS) and average willingness to pay (WTP)
8 Recall that we repeated the experiment ten times over ten experimental rounds in which the WTP
parameters were rotated among the buyers. We arbitrarily chose period 10 as the reference period, and
used dummy coding to indicate the specific round. For example, period 1 was coded as P1 = 1 and
P2, …, P9 = 0.
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the Hi-WTP and benefit them more in terms of winning percentage and bidding
activity than the Lo-WTP buyers, and thus increase market efficiency. We
summarize the results in Table 4.
According to our data, and consistent with H3, Lo-WTP buyers are more active in
terms of price initiation in the market with communication channels (2.07 bid
initiations per buyer) than in the market without communication channels (1.84 per
buyer). However, the difference was statistically not significant. In terms of the
Fig. 2 Small groups benefits from communication
Table 3 Regression test
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2
B B B
(Constant) 35.72** 34.27** 32.48**
P1 1.87 1.92 1.86
P2 0.18 0.13 0.19
P3 1.82 1.71 1.71
P4 2.66 2.61 2.67
P5 3.51 3.51 3.51
P6 4.82 5.02 5.02
P7 -2.72 -2.72 -2.58
P8 -3.55 -3.55 -3.85






Model 1: model with group size effects only
Model 2: model with both group size and communication effects
* Significance level 0.05; ** significance level 0.01
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winning bid analysis, Hi-WTP buyers were winning more often than Lo-WTP buyers
in themarket with communication channels (234 times out of 416 auctions) than in the
marketwithout communication channels (220 out of 418), but again the differencewas
statistically not significant. Hence, while the descriptive results are consistent with
both of our Hypothesis 3 and 4 with respect to market efficiency, the differences in the
data were not strong enough to statistically support either of the two.
We did, however, do some additional analysis on efficient market theory, also
indicated in Table 4, and did find support in our data for two basic efficient market
properties, which we had not formalized as hypotheses. As standard efficient market
theory would predict, Hi-WTP buyers should outperform their Lo-WTP buyers in
terms of winning more auctions overall (and independent of communication setting)
and obtain on average higher profits. On average, Hi-WTP buyersmade about two and
a half times more profit that Lo-WTP in the auctions they won. Among the auction
winners, there were also significantly more Hi-WTP bidders than Lo-WTP winners.
These results confirm that allocative resource efficiency, a standard property of
efficient markets, does occur in our experiment. In our context, this means that scarce
resources (the items sold through the auction) should be allocated (i.e. sold) to buyers
who havemore spending power and a higherwillingness to pay for them.However, we
did not find that providing a communication channel increases market efficiency.
Finally, we investigated the overall usage of the communication tool in terms of
level of messaging. As seen in Fig. 3, we find that buyers with Lo-WTP tended to
post more messages than buyers with Hi-WTP, but the difference was statistically
not significant and our Hypothesis 5 is not supported. Buyers in big groups posted
more messages than those in small groups, and the difference was statistically
marginally significant (p\ 0.1) and thus our Hypothesis 6 is weakly supported.
Overall, our data regarding the impact on group size WTP level on information
exchange activity remains inconclusive.
To summarize, our data supports three out of the six stated hypotheses. Most
importantly, our two key hypotheses, stating that communication level (H1) and group
size (H2) positively impact economic buyer performance, were supported. While we
were also able to show that our group buying market exhibits the principle
characteristics of an efficientmarket in the sense that buyerswith higherwillingness to
pay should perform stronger in the group auctions that those with lower willingness to
pay in terms of winning auction and generating profits, our data did not support our
specifically stated hypotheses that introducing a social communication tool would
Table 4 Market efficiency evaluation













Lo-WTP 20.44 198 1.84 22.77 182 2.07
Hi-WTP 50.07 220 2.47 51.33 234 2.38
Total 418 2.17 416 2.24
CC stands for communication channel
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increasemarket efficiency in terms of putting pressure on buyerwith lowerwillingness
to pay to initiate bidding more aggressively (H3) and helping buyers with higher
willingness to pay win even more auctions (H4). Concerning the factors that drive
information exchange we only found some support for our hypothesis that buyers in
larger group will use messaging more (H6), but could not support our hypothesis that
buyers with lower willingness to pay would post more messages (H5).
5.1 Post-hoc analysis
Over the ten rounds of bidding periods, groups without communication channels tend
to make lower profits as they approach the 10th and final round; groups with
communication channels tend to acquire higher profit close to the 10th round (Fig. 4).
The competition in themarketwithout communication channels among users becomes
fiercer, as buyers became more mature or more experienced. The fierce competition
among buyers might result in the lower bidding price and lower buyer surplus. The
communication channels will facilitate cooperation among buyers, which can help
buyers make more rational decisions even under the competition condition. When
buyers become more experienced over the time, the rational cooperation might lead









Small Group Big Group






Period 1-5 Period 6-10
With Communication Without Communication
Fig. 4 Buyer surplus over 10 round
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To evaluate the effectiveness of offering private communication channels, we
also examined the number of messages posted and the length of the messages both
across bids and within the successful bids (see Table 4). At the group-bid level, we
compared the accepted with the failed bids. According to the experimental results,
the groups that did not make the bid within the time limits actually posted three
times more messages and three times longer messages than the groups that did make
the final bid. However, within the groups that made the bid, the winners use the
communication channels slightly more often than the buyers who did not win. The
result suggests that if buyers cannot use communication tools effectively, they will
suffer from potential information overload (Fig. 5). If buyers cannot use commu-
nication tools effectively and get distracted with engaging in excessive messaging,
the cost of information searching and exchange could be very high and could mean
losing a winnable auction. Because the acceptance of a bid, however, depends on
interaction effects between buyers and the seller, alternative explanations could
account for that as well. For example, it is possible that for some failed bids, buyers
spend more effort to make the deals and thus send out messages with more
information, but sellers eventually decline the deals for some other reasons.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we used principles of design science—designing a business process,
implementing it, and finally evaluating it—and experimental economics to
demonstrate how business process model designs can be evaluated and potentially
improved. It also complements theoretical analyses like process virtualization
theory (Overby 2008), which predicts the virtual evolution of business process
model designs based on theoretical arguments (Table 5).
As an example, we compared two alternative designs fora sales process in a
group buying setting in the laboratory. As a case in point, we focused on only one
design element, the incorporation of a social communication feature in the group
buying sales process that is implemented on the group buying platform, and then
examined the impact on business process performance. In order to facilitate a
systematic performance evaluation we developed some performance hypotheses
based on theoretical predictions about buyer performance. In our preliminary
analysis, we find mixed support for the hypotheses, but more importantly, our
findings offer interesting insights about the business process performance of the two
designs which show that the sales process with social communication support does
help buyers to better coordinate group purchases.
From a business perspective, the intermediary that runs the group-buying
platform could use the findings of such a study to decide whether or not to redesign
the sales process they offer to their customers and provide a social communication
feature to their customers. Our findings suggest that buyers, especially buyers in
smaller groups, would benefit from using a social communication tool in terms of
group purchase coordination. Naturally, a business would likely want to run a few
more experiments, comparing various refinements and modifications regarding the
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specifics of the communication tool and the bidding rules, and also consider more
explicitly the implications for their seller customers, before making a final decision.
But in any case, our primary goal in this paper was to explain and demonstrate
how in principle, businesses can use experiments in the laboratory to evaluate
alternative business process designs prior to launching new features on their
commercial platforms. Obviously, though, transferring findings from a necessarily
simplified lab environment to the more complex real business platform setting must
be approached with caution and prudence. The key point, however, is that business
process performance evaluation comparing alternative process designs can in many
situations be done much cheaper in the lab than in the real business setting and may
offer businesses a valuable tool to help them with redesigning business processes in
order to improve business performance and customer satisfaction.
Given the constraints of laboratory experiments, we could only investigate
relatively small groups in this study. In future research, some field experiments with
much larger group size should be considered as well. In terms of IT-enabled
capacity, we only examined the effect of one such tool, a simple chatbox. In future
research, other and perhaps more sophisticated social technology features and social
media tools, which may better support coordination in larger groups, for example,
should be considered too. Also, we only looked at the buyer side performance in a
group buying market. In future research, we should look more specifically at the
seller side, too. Another interesting research direction would be to use formal
business process modeling languages to implement the process model designs that
are experimentally examined in the laboratory.
Fig. 5 Information overload curve
Table 5 Messaging use per bid
Number of MSGs Total length of MSGs




Accepted bids win 0.57 9.63
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Appendix
The experimental software: z-tree
In z-tree a market and the parameters of the market experiment are set up on the
central computer, known as the server (left of diagram). The experimenter starts the
z-tree software and loads up the file that contains the code and configuration, which
will be used by each of the participants that are running z-leaf on computers in the
lab. Data is stored on the file system of the z-leaf server as data files, where the
experiment is controlled by the experimenter (bottom of diagram). Files are saved in
both a proprietary format and excel files for easy import into statistical analysis
packages such as SAS, R, STATA, SPSS, etc. A special module of R is available (at
http://www.kirchkamp.de) to easily import data from these formats maintaining the
structure of the data objects and is available.
Each z-leaf client runs independently (subjects on the right of the diagram) but
connects to the server via the network to display market conditions or values.
Response times within the application are excellent and transactions occur sub-
second between the server and each Z-Leaf client. Once the experiment has
concluded the z-leaf client shows a blank screen and awaits for the next
experimental session to begin again, while the Z-leaf server saves the results in a
separate file and resets the values from the previous session, which begins when the
experimenter runs the next session with new participants. Researchers in economics
have used z-tree to run experiments on many different topics as summarized in the
table below. Some specific example studies include Anderhub et al. (2002a, b) and
Hey and Morone (2004).
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Economic models and treatments supported by z-tree




Ultimatum game Comparative advantage Money illusion
Prisoner’s dilemma game Principal agent Absolute
stranger
Battle of the sexes Posted offer Bargaining
Double auction (in an asset market) (with effort
choice)









You will be presented with one item to place a bid. Each product has a specific value
to you. A small time cost is assessed to you as the round progresses. During each
round you will try to acquire each of the items for the best (lowest) possible price.
You must work with other buyers to purchase the product. It requires two buyers to
agree on a price before the seller can accept an offer. Your goal is to generate as
much cumulative profit as possible, which is equal to the values of the products
minus the sum of amounts you pay for them and your time costs. Each round will last
two and a half minutes. There will be one practice followed by a number of ‘‘real’’
rounds. The total time for the entire exercise will be approximately one hour.
Bidding rules
Any buyer may submit a bid. Youmay join a bid that is no greater than the value of the
item. You may submit a new bid as long as it is greater than the highest bid. Start your
bidding low to maximize potential profit. New bids can only be done in increments of
1; therefore they can be 1 dollar higher than themaximumbid or 1 dollar lower than the
minimum bid. Once you join a bid you will not be able to remove yourself from that
offer. Once two bidders join an offer, the bid is automatically submitted to the seller. If
the value of the item drops below the current bid price, the offer will be removed. The
value of an item may be different for each buyer.
Making money
The profit you earn is equal to the value of the item bought, the bid you submit for
the item, minus the time cost you spend for it. For example, if ‘‘item A’’ is worth
$90 to you and you won the item at the end of the auction with a joint bid of $65,
and your time cost spent is $5, you will earn a profit of ($90 - $65) - $5 = $20.
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Your total game profit will be equal to the total of all your ten individual round
profits.
Key summary points
• Your goal is to make money.
• You have a cost associated with the time you spend in the auction.
• Keep a close watch on the clock especially as it counts down to the end.
• Make sure you work with other buyers to get the best possible price.
• Remember you need at least two buyers to make an offer.
• Start your bidding low to give yourself the best possible profit.
Instructions for sellers (small groups)
General overview
You will be presented with two units of one item that you want to sell in an auction.
You have a small cost associated with the time you spend in the auction. During
each round you will try to sell your item for the highest possible price. Your goal is
to generate as much profit as possible, which is equal to the price at which you sell
the item minus the time cost you spend for it. Each round will last two and a half
minutes. There will be one practice round and a number of ‘‘real’’ rounds. The total
time for the entire exercise will be approximately one hour. Instructions for the big
group treatment are similar and not included.
Bidding rules
Your product is automatically entered into the auction allowing bidders to submit
bids, which you may accept. A bid will only be submitted to you when 2 buyers join
the offer. You may choose to accept the bid at anytime or allow the bid to expire.
The auction will end once you accept an offer or at the end of, 150 s (two and a half
minutes).
Making money
The round profit you earn is equal to the highest offer you accept for the item minus
the time cost for the item. For example, if the offer you accept is $90 at the end of
the auction, and your time cost is $10, you will earn a profit of $90 - $10 = $80.
Your total game profit will be equal to the total of all your round profits.
Key summary points
• Your goal is to make money.
• Try and get the largest profit possible.
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• You have a cost associated with the time you spend in the auction.
• Keep a close watch on the clock especially as it counts down to the end.
Example buyer screens
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